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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN NATIONAL MORTGAGE, INC.,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
VS.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

' . .

JAY E. BOWEN and FRANCIS D.
BOWEN, his wife,
Civil No. 14473
Defendants and
Appellants.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action by Respondent-Plaintiff to enforce the provisions
of a Uniform Real Estate Contract and to declare the parties rights and
obligations thereunder, specifically compelling Appellajit-Defendants to accept
Plaintiff's tender, and by way of counterclaim by Appellants, an action to
foreclose on a Uniform Real Estate Contract, wherein Appellants were sellers,
as a mortgage and for damages.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, Judge Jay E. Banks presiding,
found that the Plaintiff made a good faith effort to tender the money to
Defendant pursuant to the terms of the contract and that a sufficient and
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and proper tender was made, and accordingly entered judgment in accordance
with a stipulation between the parties, in favor of Defendants in the amount
of $2,757.50.
EXACT NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
ON APPEAL
Respondent requests this court to affirm judgment of the lower
court.

The lower court judgment should be affirmed even if this court deter-

mines that the lower court's reasoning in support of the decision is in any
way lacking, since the most Appellants could claim is that it was the right
decision for the wrong reasons.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The state of the record on appeal and Appellant's Brief present
several somewhat unusual procedural problems. Appellant has violated Rule 75,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in at least five particulars which make it
difficult for Respondent's counsel to write a proper brief on the law and
the facts as a brief should be written.
The Appellant has not served a designation of contents of the record
on appeal on either the Respondent or Respondent's counsel as required by
Rule 75(a).

Neither did the Appellant serve or file a certificate stating

that a transcript of the evidence had been ordered or that he did not intend
to rely thereon as required by Rule 75(a)(1).

Furthermore, where the Appellant

does not intend to rely on all the evidence and does not include all of the
evidence in his designation, he is obligated to "file a copy of such parts
thereof as the Respondent may need to enable him to designate the parts he
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On the same page, Appellants state that nthere is no evidence of Defendants'
refusing to accept an oral offer of money".

Respondent strongly disagrees with

these last two statements since counsel's clear recollection is that evidence
was offered on Defendants' refusal to accept an oral offer of money and the
evidence did substantiate paragraph six of the court's Findings of Facts.
Furthermore, this court will search in vain to find any Notice of Delinquency
or Declaration of Forfeiture in this record.

:

Since there is no real record before this court other than the
basic pleadings, this court under Rule 75(h) could order the record supplemented
if that were necessary.

Counsel for Respondent believes that although the

record is somewhat inadequate on the facts, the law is so clearly in favor of
sustaining the decision of the lower court even on the facts in this record,
that this court can affirm the lower court's decision even with the inadequate
record.

'
Counsel for Respondent will avoid referring to matters outside the

record presented to this court on appeal, even though much evidence was introduced below that would support the judgment of the lower court. Furthermore,
under the circumstances, it would seem that this court should place great weight
on the Findings of Fact of the lower court since the trial judge heard the
evidence and observed the witnesses and made the findings accordingly.
Appellants have only naked assertions to matters for the most part outside of
the record in support of theirposition.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Simply summarized, and pursuant to stipulation (R.10-11), this
case involves the issues of tender and the waiver of any objections to the
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sufficiency thereof if tender is found to be insufficient.

Plaintiff and

Defendants entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract for the sale of
a tract of land on December 7, 1972 (R.44-47; Appellants' Brief, p.2).
Pursuant to that contract, Plaintiff owed Defendants a balance of $3,000 to
be paid on or before June 1, 1973 (R.44).

Pursuant to the addendum to the

contract of even date, buyer was to deduct $2,50 for each "junk" car on the
premises from the final payment, due on June 1, 1973 (R,47; Appellants1
Brief, p.5).

Deducting the amount for the cars from the $3,000 left a balance

of $2,750.50 which was to be the stipulated amount of judgment against
Plaintiff (Plaintiff admitting that much to be owed) unless the lower court
found a $300 survey to be valid deduction in which case the lower court was
to enter judgment against Plaintiff in the amount of $2,450.00 (R.ll, par. 7e).
If tender was found insufficient, the stipulated judgment was to be for $4,750.00.
The parties agreed that the trial would be tried on the issues of
sufficiency of tender as to the amount and the manner in which it was attempted,
avoidance of tender by Defendants, and waiver of objections to tender by
Defendants (R.10-11).

It was further stipulated that the purported tender was

timely and that no objections to Plaintiff's tender were made until August 13,
1976 (R. 10, par. 7a,b).

It was also contemplated that the issues to be tried

on which Defendants hoped to prevail were the proper person and place of tender
(R.ll, par.7c).
In the Findings of Fact, the court did find that there was a sufficient
tender (R.6, par. 5,6,7,8; pg. 7, par.1-3) and, by implication, that any objections
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to tender were waived (R.7, par. 8,1).

- ••

The Plaintiff contends that shortly before June 1, 1973, he attempted
to establish communication with the Defendants to arrange tender for the full
amount and that these attempts included at least two phone calls on June 1,
1973 (R.12).

Plaintiff contended further that circumstances surrounding these

attempts to reach Defendants to arrange tender constituted avoidance of
tender by Defendants such that Plaintiff was unable to make tender personally
to Defendants (R.12).

.

When Plaintiff was unable to reach Defendants, he deposited $2,450,
or the balance he believed due under the tender, with Security Title Company
(R.13; Appellants1 Brief, pg. 5) which company Plaintiff claims (a) was
acting as escrow agent for both parties, (b) had arranged the closing of the
deal, and (c) from which Defendants had picked up the original down payment
(R.9, items 2,3;R.13).
-

,„

,....

POINT I.

PLAINTIFF MADE A SUFFICIENT
TENDER TO THE APPELLANTS-DEFENDANTS
Tender is defined as nthe act by which one produces and offers to
a person holding a claim or demand against him the amount of money which he
considers and admits to be due, in satisfaction of such claim or demand, without
any stipulation or condition.!t

86 CIS, Tender, Section 1.

It is significant

that proper tender does not require that the inputed tenderee actually physically
accept the payment, but only that the person owing the obligation make an offer
of the proper amount at the proper time and place without attaching any
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unauthorized condition thereto. A Utah Statute provides:
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of
money or to deliver a written instrument or
specific personal property, is, if not accepted,
equivalent to the actual production and tender
of the money, instrument, or property, Utah
Code Ann. 1953, Section 78-27-1.
Since counsel had already stipulated that there was no question
as to the timeliness of tender, the lower court had only to find that under
the facts and circumstances of this case, tender was of the proper amount,
made at the proper place and without unwarranted conditions. At the trial
of this matter, Plaintiff introduced a memorandum letter dated May 29, 1973
(R.9) which Plaintiff claims was a letter in which Plaintiff offered to meet
and pay the whole amount due under the contract (R.13).

In addition, Plaintiff

introduced evidence and adduced testimony to the effect that Plaintiff attempted
several times on or subsequent to June 1, 1973, to meet Defendant Jay Bowen
and make tender the final amount due under the contract. There was evidence
and testimony of a specific meeting between the parties on June 5, 1973, at
which Plaintiff made a full offer of tender of the full amount of $2,750.50.
Unfortunately, because of the difficulties ennumerated in the preliminary statement above, Respondent's counsel cannot point to the pages in the transcript
where such occurred, but evidence of the fact that such did occur is found in
the Findings of Fact, numbers five and six which read as follows:
5. That on several occasions, on or subsequent to June
1, 1973, Plaintiff attempted to meet with Defendant to make tender
of the final amount due under the contract;
6. That on June 5, 1973, Plaintiff met Defendants on the
property in question and tendered him the full amount due under the
contract, which amount was Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Seven
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Dollars and Fifty Cents ($2,757.50), which amount represented
Three Thousand Dollars minus an amount equal to the value of the
cars, which Defendant purchased back from Plaintiff pursuant to the
addendum in the contract. (R. 6,7)
iince Appellants have cited no evidence in the record to contradict these
!

indings, it is clear as a matter of law that sufficient tender as to amount

ras made by Respondent.

/

;

As to the place of tender, the law cited hereinabove indicates
:hat an otherwise valid tender is not insufficient because the imputed tenderee
"efuses to physically accept the same. Although, again, Respondents counsel
:annot point to the evidence at trial wherein the Appellant refused to accept
Lender on June 5th, the court can deduce this fact from the statement in Appellants
Brief on page 4, wherein the following is found:
s

In Defendants' Notice of Delinquency to Plaintiff,
dated August 13, 1973, paragraph two, the sum of
Two Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Seven Dollars and
Fifty Cents ($2,787.50) past due was set forth.

The point is that the Appellant cannot be heard to complain that
tender was made at an improper place when that tender was refused.
Further evidence in this scanty record of the fact that tender
occurred at the proper place can be deduced by Appellants1 apparent admission
that Two Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Dollars ($2,450.00) was tendered to the
Security Title Company on June 13, 1973 (Appellants1 Brief, pg.7-9).
court made a finding to that effect (R.7, par.7).

The

The court thereby concluded,

based upon the evidence of the trial, that Security Title Company was a contemplated place at which Plaintiff could make tender (R.7, par.3).

The reason

the court made that conclusion of law was because of the existence of an escrow
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statement between the parties at Security Title (R.9, item 2).
POINT II.
THE APPELLANTS-DEFENDANTS WAIVED ANY
OBJECTION TO TENDER AS A MATTER OF LAW
Even if this court does not feel that the record is sufficient
to make a decision on this case on the issues of sufficiency of tender, the
court should nevertheless uphold the decision of the trial court because the
evidence even in this scanty record substantiates the fact that the Appellants
waived any objection to tender.
The stipulation between the parties clearly states as a fact that
the first objection to the purported tender, regardless of whether the tender
was insufficient as to the proper amount or the proper place, or whether it
attached an improper condition, was August 13, 1973 (R.10, par. 7a). Furthermore, although the parties agreed via the stipulation to try the issue of the
proper place of tender and the person to whom the tender was made, it was
stipulated in the lower court that the Defendants never made any "objection to
the person or place of tender" (R.ll, par.7c).
Because of the stipulation and points specifically ennumerated in
the above paragraph, Utah statutory and case law compel the conclusion that
any objections to tender are waived. A Utah Statute provides:
A person to whom a tender is made must, at the
time, specify any objection he may have to
the money, instrument, or property or he is
deemed to have waived it; and, if the objection
is to the amount of money, the terms of the
instrument or the amount or kind or property,
he must specify that amounts, terms, or kind which
he requires, or be precluded from objection afterwards. Utah Code Ann., 1953, Section 78-27-3
Abundant evidence, to which Respondent cannot refer to in this record, was
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introduced at trial regarding several tender attempts.

It is clear from the

record even as it stands, that at least one tender of $2,450 was made
by Respondent-Plaintiff on June 13, 1973 (Appellants1 Brief, pg. 7-9). Since
the Appellants made no objection to this tender by Appellant Jay Bowenfs own
admission until at least August 13, 1976, any and all subsequent objections
to the amount, place, or condition of tender are waived.
The Utah Statute seems completely in harmony with the general law on
the subject. As to amount, the rule on waiver to objection has been stated
as follows:
It has been held that an objection to the amount
of the tender must be taken at the time the tender
is made, otherwise it is waived. (Citation) Where
the sum tendered is less than the sum claimed and
the tender is refused by the creditor on some
ground other than that the amount is too small, as
where it is claimed that the contract is forfeited,
or that the tender is not made in time, or that an
agent to whom the tender is made has no authority to
receive it, tenderee waives the objection to the
insufficiency of the amount. 87 CJS, Tender,
Section 12A. (Emphasis added.)
Regarding objection to the proper place of tender, the same source has stated:
An objection that a tender is not made at the proper
place is waived unless objected to on that ground.
86 CJS, Tender, Section 20.
In addition to the substantial case law cited in Corpus Juris
Secundum for the above propositions, the Utah case of Ulibarri v. Christensen,
2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P. 2d 170 (1954), stands the proposition that, under Utah
Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-27-3, a tender is sufficient unless objected
to on specified grounds at the time tender was made. There is no question
under the facts of this case that Defendant was aware of tender and made no
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objection to the same until August 13, 1973.
Under the Utah case of Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 373 P.2d
974 (1954), a tender must be made in good faith and in such a manner as to
make it most likely that, under the circumstances, the creditor will be benefited.
Under the case of Romero v. Schmidt, 15 Utah 2d 300, 392 P.2d 37 (1964), the
court held that although a phone call offering to pay any existing delinquency
upon receipt of a verified balance was not generally a tender, it was under
the facts and circumstances of that case.

It is clear in the case at the

bar that Appellant made good faith tender in an acceptable manner under the
facts and circumstances of this particular case.
There was a factual dispute at the trial regarding whether or not
Appellant Jay Bowen had agreed to pay for a survey of the land.

It is immaterial

for the purposes of this brief whether or not Respondent's insistence that
Appellant pay for the survey and subsequent deduction from the amount tendered
was an unwarranted restriction or condition upon tender. Theoretically, if
it was an unwarranted restriction, it was waived along with any other objections
not made at the time and place of the purported tender.
CONCLUSION
The court found, based upon its observance of all witnesses and viewing of evidence that Appellants-Defendants1 claims were not credible and
accordingly found that the Respondent was only obligated to the AppellantsDefendants on the counterclaim in the amount of $2,750.50 instead of $4,750,
which would have been the amount had Appellants prevailed.

The basis of the

courtfs decision is clearly seen in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
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Law, which indicate that the court simply found a sufficient tender.

}

,

Because the court found a sufficient tender, it was never required
to reach the issue of waiver of objections to tender. Were this court able
to view the entire record, it would have no question as to the validity of
the lower court's finding. However, even with the scanty record present here,
there is enough evidence for the court to sustain the judgment of the lower
court, either to the effect that there was a sufficient tender or based upon
the stipulation and admitted facts, that any objections to tender were waived
by the Appellants-Defendants, v
DATED this

/ J-

day of August, 1976.
SUM1ERHAYS $ SWOPE

Robert B. Sykes
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